I've noticed a number of people have come to my site looking for recommendations for a good tikkun, due to my previous post some months ago in search of one myself.
I have since looked at a ridiculous number of tikkunim in my search for the 'best' (quite subjectively, based on my criteria mentioned in the previous post). I ended up buying one, and will probably buy three more to round out my collection.
Thus, my official recommendations:
1) "Tikkun Kor'im Hameduyak" from the Ish Matzliach, published by "Machon HaRav Mazliach". This is the tikkun I use for most of my preparation.
Pluses:
- It's very large (a plus for when I'm tired and my eyes aren't focusing well)
- Very clear typesetting; the font is quite readable, words are well-spaced, and nikkud and te'amim are distinct and carefully placed.
- The text seems to be fairly good. It differs in some places from the Koren edition, but in those cases almost always agrees with Breuer.
- There is very little 'clutter'. A few abnormal notes or bits of nikkud are carefully footnoted (generally 1-3 per page), but other than that there are *no* extraneous marks... IMHO, a great plus over the Tikkun Simanim. The footnotes also give a few leyning tips - generally when a commentator specifies that it should be read with a conscious pause to emphasize the correct meaning (most of the time being in line with the te'amim).
- Abnormal syllables are marked (ie, mil'ra when one would have expected mil'eil or vice versa). The mark is inline with the right-hand text (as are k'ri/k'tiv differences), which seems confusing but one quickly adapts to.
- Shva nah/nach are labelled, as are kamatz katan/gadol and dagesh kal/dagesh chazak. The symbols are fairly intuitive and relatively subtle, so a quick reading can ignore the differences and focus on the words.
- Weekday aliyot are marked.
- There are short overviews of hilchot k'riat hatorah, hilchot sefer torah (ie when to tell if a word is pasul or not), and k'lalei hadikduk. The text is fairly clear, though could use a few more figures.
Minuses:
- It's a Sefaradi tikkun, so aliyah breaks can sometimes be a little bit skewed from an Ashkenazi tradition. Sometimes this is marked in a footnote; other times it is not. Haftarot have both Sefaradi and Ashkenazi versions, however, so all one needs to do is check the aliyah length to confirm it matches with one's tradition.
- The tikkun only has Megillat Esther and no other megillot.
- Haftarah sections only have one column; this can be an issue if one is learning to leyn from a scroll.
- It's awfully big, which can be a pain to lug around and keep on the bimah. (Yes, I also listed this as a plus. So sue me.)
2) "Tikkun Simanim", the most popular tikkun in use today. I only looked carefully at the Ashkenazi version, but the Sefaradi version seems to be comparable, with only minor differences. I don't own this yet (though I have bought it for another leyner), but expect I'll buy it relatively soon and keep it as a reference, perhaps as one run through to check everything.
Pluses:
- It's got every possible bell and whistle - every bit of nikkud is marked, weird te'amim/pronunciations are footnoted some ridiculously number of different ways, and they even have little marks for parallel structure to make learning easier.
- Importantly, it has the Minchat Shai along the side, which is one of the major authorities on differing manuscripts and the 'correct' masoretic version. Generally, the tikkun follows the Minchat Shai.
- It comes in three different sizes, which is nice as it allows one to prepare with a larger size, but to bring the smaller one along for shul or traveling.
- All five megillot are there (IIRC), and haftarot have two columns (again, IIRC, I don't have it in front of me; I'll edit it if this is incorrect)
- There's a very nice introduction to nikkud and te'amim with lots of examples and figures.
- Nice, but occasionally annoying: it differentiates between things like Pashta and Kadma (even though anyone who looks at the word should be able to tell) and between P'sik and Munach l'garmeh (useful, though again not too exciting).
Minuses:
- The page is too busy. There's footnotes, random other pronunciation guides, etc. all over the page.
- This was the killer for me: On the left hand side are 'shaded' phrases that show parallel structure, with footnotes to explanations on how best to learn the section. It may be useful for some people, but when I want to learn on the left-hand side, I want it to look exactly like in the scroll... and not with any helpful hints.
- Because of all of the information crammed into each page, the typeset is fairly small, which can be a pain in poor lighting or when one is tired.
In short: it's the most complete tikkun out there, and it's a great reference book, but not one I would use for the bulk of my preparation.
3) The Tikkun put out by the Koren chaps. I won't give pluses or minuses for this, but just discuss it. As most of my readers who have gotten this far in the post will know, the Koren edition of the Tanach was for a long time the authoritative version, and it is still a highly respected edition. They put out a fairly frill-free Tanach that has a few nice features - the tikkun shows places where one can break for extra aliyot (or where one shouldn't), and has a very large, clearly readable typeset. The version I saw was not in the classical column format of most tikkunim, but I believe there is one out there that looks more 'tikkun-like'. One other complaint: the version I saw only had Megillat Esther, and not other megillot.
In short, it's a good idea to practice against the Koren edition at least once in prepping for a parsha, so it's a useful tikkun to have, but nowhere near essential if one has other copies of the Koren. The aliyah break suggestions are a nice touch, though.
4) This last tikkun is one I have only seen once and am planning on buying as soon as I can get my grubby paws on another copy. It was a tikkun put out by the Choreiv (Horeb) publishers, using the Breuer edition of the Tanach, based directly off of the Keter Aram Tzova/Aleppo Codex (those parts that survived). This text has IMHO superceded the Koren text as the authoritative Masoretic text, and I also try to use the Breuer Tanach in resolving differences between texts. Most of the differences are fairly minor (stuff like shvas vs. t'nuot chatufot), but I wouldn't be a leyner if I wasn't anal retentive.
It was an odd edition - very thick but kind of short. Facing pages corresponded to the 'marked' and 'unmarked' columns of a typical tikkun. IIRC, it only had Megillat Esther, and had next to no other marking/help that characterize the Ish Matzliach and Simanim tikkunim. The column format is nice in that if the scroll one is reading from has an unusual format (some do), the Breuer will prepare one very well for switching column formats without a hitch.
When I find this tikkun, I plan on using it as my 'bimah' tikkun. The typeset is large, there are *no* confusing extraneous marks, and the text is the best out there. I will probably prep with the Ish Matzliach, use the Simanim to look up specific words and phrases, and run through once with the Breuer to confirm all of my words are correct. The Koren will be pulled out for leyning at big simchahs where you've got half a dozen extra aliyot to squeeze in, or to adjudicate disputes between Tikkunim (in addition to the Breuer).
So, there you have it: my recommendations as a nearly professional leyner. I'd recommend that beginners get the Simanim tikkun just because it really holds your hand for everything... though you should make sure to do at least some prep with another tikkun! More advanced leyners should use the Ish Matzliach in conjuction with Breuer's (if you can find it).
I'm welcome any thoughts that visitors have on other tikkunim they use. I looked at another half-dozen or so, but these were the ones I felt were the best out there.
Enjoy, and happy leyning!
Oh, by the way. People who are looking to find copies of Rav Breuer's "Ta'amei Hamikra Bekaf-aleph Sefarim Uv'sifrei Eme"t" are going to have some trouble. My girlfriend's family scoured bookstores in Israel for days before they found one old copy buried somewhere. My advice would be to find a leyner who has it and borrow the book - either that, or get a kick-ass girlfriend. I'll try to write a review after I complete it to let you know if there's any information there that you can't find elsewhere. I certainly consider Breuer the authority regarding this kind of thing. Good luck!
Alternatively, the Simanim people put out a book called 'Tuv Ta'am' which seems to have a lot of the basic information. I plan on buying it sometime, but haven't gotten around to it yet. It's probably a good replacement for Breuer's book, though not straight from the horse's mouth.
31.12.06
26.12.06
Did you know...
...that there is a private company in the United States that is involved in the manufacture and distribution of WMDs? Yes, they even sell kits with the necessary ingredients and instructions on how to assemble one.
I bought one.
Yes, Duncan Hines makes some serious Weapons of Mass Deliciousness.
Disclaimer: This post was not in any way influenced by a sucrose overdose as an aftereffect of baking a Butter Recipe Golden cake smothered in Chocolate Buttercream frosting. Not at all.
I bought one.
Yes, Duncan Hines makes some serious Weapons of Mass Deliciousness.
Disclaimer: This post was not in any way influenced by a sucrose overdose as an aftereffect of baking a Butter Recipe Golden cake smothered in Chocolate Buttercream frosting. Not at all.
25.12.06
I vant to suck your...
I'm sure all of my readers already know about this issue, but I'll pitch in with my own plea.
I receive frequent phone calls from my local Red Cross (Chesapeake Region) about their critically low inventories of blood and platelets. Ironically, during the supposed 'season of giving', this problem has become even more acute; I imagine because many donors may be on vacation or otherwise occupied. In my region, some blood types have less than a day of supply left, and are falling behind seriously in the donation department. A week or two ago, I received a call that they had two units of platelets left for the entire region - hardly enough for day-to-day medicine, let alone coping with emergencies.
So, I urge you - wherever you are - go donate some blood. I personally donate platelets instead (my blood type is AB+, so whole blood is of extremely limited use, but apheresis donations are exactly what they're looking for), but the point is that you should donate something. It's not hard to do - donating blood takes much less than an hour, and platelets only about two hours - and anyone who's healthy probably won't feel any ill effects besides a touch of orthostatic intolerance. You can donate blood every 8 weeks, and platelets every two weeks. It takes little effort, and it's well worth it. Heck, many Red Cross regions now have incentive programs set up for frequent donors! You might even make a profit. (One downside is that you get a ridiculous number of T-shirts and postcards...)
The blood won't go to waste: it will be used to save people's lives, every day (generally used in surgery or trauma cases). How much easier could it be to make such an important impact? Think of it as storing up some good karma - after all, if you (or a family member) needs a transfusion someday, wouldn't you prefer there to be a ready supply?
Please. Make me happy. I'll be your best friend.
I receive frequent phone calls from my local Red Cross (Chesapeake Region) about their critically low inventories of blood and platelets. Ironically, during the supposed 'season of giving', this problem has become even more acute; I imagine because many donors may be on vacation or otherwise occupied. In my region, some blood types have less than a day of supply left, and are falling behind seriously in the donation department. A week or two ago, I received a call that they had two units of platelets left for the entire region - hardly enough for day-to-day medicine, let alone coping with emergencies.
So, I urge you - wherever you are - go donate some blood. I personally donate platelets instead (my blood type is AB+, so whole blood is of extremely limited use, but apheresis donations are exactly what they're looking for), but the point is that you should donate something. It's not hard to do - donating blood takes much less than an hour, and platelets only about two hours - and anyone who's healthy probably won't feel any ill effects besides a touch of orthostatic intolerance. You can donate blood every 8 weeks, and platelets every two weeks. It takes little effort, and it's well worth it. Heck, many Red Cross regions now have incentive programs set up for frequent donors! You might even make a profit. (One downside is that you get a ridiculous number of T-shirts and postcards...)
The blood won't go to waste: it will be used to save people's lives, every day (generally used in surgery or trauma cases). How much easier could it be to make such an important impact? Think of it as storing up some good karma - after all, if you (or a family member) needs a transfusion someday, wouldn't you prefer there to be a ready supply?
Please. Make me happy. I'll be your best friend.
24.12.06
Confidence building my ass
Now that my exams are over and I can relax and do work for the next month or so, you will hopefully be seeing more of my posts. I promise they won't all be on the topic I'm about to discuss, either. I swear. But you're going to have to live with this post because it needs to be said.
I'm going to have to be honest with you. Sixteen months ago, I supported the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip. It was not wholehearted support; for one, I was skeptical of the government's ability and readiness to adequately compensate and relocate more than 0.1% of their population (that would be like the US compensating and relocating 300k people; possible, but damn difficult). I was also concerned about the growing vilification of anti-disengagement protesters; there were tens of thousands (if not more) of them, and they were almost uniformly peaceful in their forms of protest... yet were systematically demonized by the media and government. I've previously written about the aftereffects of this, and it was troubling me even before the disengagement began. Nonetheless, it seemed a fairly minor concern (and a reversible one) compared to the possible benefits.
Why did I support the disengagement? After all, large swaths of the communities in which I associate were strenuously opposed to the move. I had several reasons:
1) I felt that a civilian withdrawal from Gaza was inevitable for any sort of final solution. The West Bank is an entirely different situation, as most of the settlement placements allow for the drawing of a logical border between Israel and a Palestinian state (more on this later); Gaza, though, had the bulk of the Palestinian population living between the major settlement bloc (Gush Katif) and Green Line Israel. Furthermore, the population numbers were staggeringly in the Palestinian favor (8k to somewhere on the order of 1-1.2 million), and the land no longer has as much strategic significance as the West Bank... especially with a mostly demilitarized Sinai.
2) With an such an obvious inevitability, I felt it was a worthwhile gamble. A complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip would give Israel - and the world - a chance to see what the Palestinians would do with a land under their de facto control (though not yet a state de jure). If Abbas' 'moderate' talk could be turned into a viable reality, free of Israeli military pressures and the presence of settlements, it would be vastly easier to establish some sort of compromise regarding the stickier issue of the West Bank.
3) Furthermore, any Palestinian attacks emanating from the Gaza Strip would then be subject to an immediate and overwhelming military response. Palestinians would have no excuse of an 'occupation' of the Gaza Strip for continued attacks on Israel (particularly through the use of suicide bombers at border crossings or through Qassam attacks on Israeli towns). Thus, world opinion would be firmly on Israel's side, which was continuing to be attacked despite an extremely costly and painful evacuation of 8,000 settlers. A military incursion would probably be a difficult sell, but various strikes (air/naval/artillery/etc.) would certainly be available to respond to attacks.
So, how well did my plans work out?
Heh. You are undoubtedly aware (unless you have your head in the sand) that the Gaza Strip hasn't exactly been an island of calm. Let's see what happened:
- A hasty evacuation. Palestinians rush to the evacuated settlements to loot, destroy the greenhouses they were supposed to use to become economically self-sufficient, and burn synagogues.
- Hamas wins the Palestinian elections. Not exactly an endorsement of peace. Many critics of the disengagement point to the Hamas electoral victory as a sign that the Palestinians viewed the Israeli withdrawal as a military defeat at the hands of Hamas; hence their popular support. I'm skeptical; it seems more likely that Fatah can't get votes without party discipline or the personality cult surrounding Yasser Arafat.
- Qassam fire continues unabated, and actually increases significantly in range and accuracy (as well as numbers). Since disenagement, something like half a dozen Israelis have been killed by Qassams, and dozens more have been wounded. Economic and property damage (particularly to Sderot) is in the millions, not to mention psychological trauma from nearly daily mortar fire. Attempts to curb Qassam fire by half-hearted military tactics (mostly artillery hitting empty fields and airstrikes, with a handful of commando operations) have only limited success.
- Arms smuggling under the Egyptian border occurs at a breakneck pace; tons of weaponry, some of it advanced antitank missiles (which gave Israel so much trouble in Lebanon) and reportedly longer range rockets (though this may have been a boast by the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade). Egyptian authorities are reluctant to commit much force to ending smuggling, and world reaction to Israeli closures of the border makes that a politically unwise move for more than a week or two. Also, smuggling of funds by Hamas occurs openly through the EU-controlled Rafah crossing. Hamas begins training its forces in earnest for an all-out battle with Israel for control of the Gaza Strip, fortifying its positions and improving its weaponry and tactics.
- Hamas operatives attack Israel by tunneling under the Gaza border, kill a number of soldiers, and take Gilad Shalit hostage. This precipitates semi-serious Israeli ground action in Gaza, which is scaled down due to the Lebanon war, international pressure, and disagreements between the political and military echelons (Olmert and Peretz generally working on dead-end negotiations and urging 'calm' despite previous claims to the contrary, while IDF commanders urge an incursion in force to permanently hold positions being used for much of the rocket launching, with West Bank-style nightly arrest raids to make the Strip 'behave' in much the way that the West Bank does). Negotiations for Shalit's release, while rumored for months to be 'nearly complete', seem to drag on indefinitely. Indirect IDF action to curb Qassam fire (e.g. artillery) ends up accidentally killing a number of Palestinian civilians.
- Fatah-Hamas tensions, always a significant issue, come to a head. General disturbances break out in Gaza, resulting in a number of deaths and assassinations (including several children who are gunned down during an assassination attempt). Repeated 'truces' arbitrated between Abbas and Haniyeh fail to stop the fighting. As part of one of these truces, the PA pledges to stop rocket fire (supposedly deploying thousands of police to do so), yet the rockets continue to fall - today, hitting next to a nursery in Sderot, though fortunately not killing any children.
- Throughout it all, the Palestinian economy falls apart even more in the factional violence (particularly with the general Western embargo of aid to Hamas, given the organization's continued endorsement of terrorism).
So, where does this leave us? The Gaza Strip is a mess. And, to be honest, I don't have much patience for those who want me to feel sympathy. Israel left, in a difficult process, and this is what the Palestinians have made of their chance. The violence has only increased (despite the complete absence of Israeli troops and civilians for close to a year, and the relative absence of troops thereafter) and the Palestinians are doing a wonderful job of torpedoing any hope they may have had for a decent future.
It makes me furious. Do I still think Israel should have gone through the wrenching process of disengagement? Probably, if only to show that this is what happens. However, I see no reason to endorse any further Israeli withdrawals or concessions. No 'confidence building steps' to support Abbas - no $100 million in withheld taxes to shore up his party, no Fatah 'militant' (read: terrorists who we don't hate quite as much as Hamas) groups allowed in from Jordan, and certainly no release of prisoners just to show we're nice people. [Note: All three of these have been approved/will be soon by the Olmert government. Whiskey, Tango, Foxtrot...]
These sorts of things betray the thinking that was behind the disengagement - noble thoughts, but ones that have clearly been disproven by continued Palestinian intransigence and violence. Every Israeli concession has been treated as a sign that the Palestinian method of 'negotiation' (ie, shoot at people until they give up) works, and they only redouble their efforst at such forms of... ahem... diplomacy.
So, you ask, what is the solution? Obviously, Israel cannot let the situation in Sderot continue, nor can they allow Hamas to use Iranian funds and weapons to make the Gaza Strip a fortified terrorist state within 20 km of the Israeli heartland.
My proposed solution is not a 'solution' but a stalling tactic. I'd suggest that (probably after the fall of the Olmert government) the IDF be given a green light for a systematic military operation against terrorist activity in Gaza. This will involve the establishment of semi-permanent military positions on or near major Qassam launching areas (the withdrawal from which last year allowed terrorists to achieve much better range and accuracy in launching Qassams) and other strategic regions; a system of roadblocks and checkpoints to restrict the transport of weapons and terrorists; aggressive action along the Philadelphi corridor and in Rafah to close tunnels and stop smuggling; immediate targeting of all Hamas government leaders who are involved in the military wing of the organization; nightly arrest raids into Palestinian cities; destruction of arms caches, etc.
It would be bloody, in the beginning - probably worse than Defensive Shield. And the IDF would pick up casualties during the 'maintenance' phase, as well... but military casualties are better than Israeli civilian casualties (a minor detail that recent Israeli governments have sometimes had difficulty remembering). Palestinian civilian casualties would also occur, but probably not significantly worse than from the current Gaza infighting and indirect Israeli tactics (airstrikes/artillery/etc.). Most importantly, this operation would make the Gaza Strip 'behave' in a way that it hasn't for over a decade. The model was adopted for the West Bank because it was necessary given the lack of an effective border and the relatively increased movement between Palestinian and Israeli areas. It can be adapted for Gaza, and it can work to keep things on a 'low simmer' as they are in the West Bank.
A good solution? Hardly! The world would be pissed, but to be honest, they're going to be pissed anyways, so Israel might as well earn some security at the same time. It won't work forever, but it will buy Israel some peace for its citizens. Suicide bombings were stopped by the WB barrier and Defensive Shield; Qassams and Hamas rearmament can be stopped by similar tactics.
The only long term solution, though, is not one Israel can impose... or even one that can be negotiated with Western pressure. It will come someday through the Palestinian people themselves. They will look at their leaders and role models and realize that the Palestinian logic of 'resistance' and refusal to compromise - even in the face of serious chances (such as the disengagement, or the 2000 Camp David summit) - will always fail, as Israel isn't planning on marching into the sea anytime soon. They will rise up and install new leaders who will follow the example of Sadat and Hussein in working with the Israelis in a spirit of compromise - albeit a grudging one.
Until that day, though, the disengagement has taught me that Israel cannot afford any more 'confidence building measures' that expose its nurseries to shelling.
[Note: As of this morning, there have been fifty-six Qassams fired at Israel since the 'truce' began a few weeks ago. According to this article, only three months in the past year have had more Qassam attacks than this past month, during the supposed 'calm' from the 'truce'. I am less than impressed. So, Israel pulled its troops out of Gaza again to honor a 'truce' that in fact brings no peace. Hmm.]
I'm going to have to be honest with you. Sixteen months ago, I supported the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip. It was not wholehearted support; for one, I was skeptical of the government's ability and readiness to adequately compensate and relocate more than 0.1% of their population (that would be like the US compensating and relocating 300k people; possible, but damn difficult). I was also concerned about the growing vilification of anti-disengagement protesters; there were tens of thousands (if not more) of them, and they were almost uniformly peaceful in their forms of protest... yet were systematically demonized by the media and government. I've previously written about the aftereffects of this, and it was troubling me even before the disengagement began. Nonetheless, it seemed a fairly minor concern (and a reversible one) compared to the possible benefits.
Why did I support the disengagement? After all, large swaths of the communities in which I associate were strenuously opposed to the move. I had several reasons:
1) I felt that a civilian withdrawal from Gaza was inevitable for any sort of final solution. The West Bank is an entirely different situation, as most of the settlement placements allow for the drawing of a logical border between Israel and a Palestinian state (more on this later); Gaza, though, had the bulk of the Palestinian population living between the major settlement bloc (Gush Katif) and Green Line Israel. Furthermore, the population numbers were staggeringly in the Palestinian favor (8k to somewhere on the order of 1-1.2 million), and the land no longer has as much strategic significance as the West Bank... especially with a mostly demilitarized Sinai.
2) With an such an obvious inevitability, I felt it was a worthwhile gamble. A complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip would give Israel - and the world - a chance to see what the Palestinians would do with a land under their de facto control (though not yet a state de jure). If Abbas' 'moderate' talk could be turned into a viable reality, free of Israeli military pressures and the presence of settlements, it would be vastly easier to establish some sort of compromise regarding the stickier issue of the West Bank.
3) Furthermore, any Palestinian attacks emanating from the Gaza Strip would then be subject to an immediate and overwhelming military response. Palestinians would have no excuse of an 'occupation' of the Gaza Strip for continued attacks on Israel (particularly through the use of suicide bombers at border crossings or through Qassam attacks on Israeli towns). Thus, world opinion would be firmly on Israel's side, which was continuing to be attacked despite an extremely costly and painful evacuation of 8,000 settlers. A military incursion would probably be a difficult sell, but various strikes (air/naval/artillery/etc.) would certainly be available to respond to attacks.
So, how well did my plans work out?
Heh. You are undoubtedly aware (unless you have your head in the sand) that the Gaza Strip hasn't exactly been an island of calm. Let's see what happened:
- A hasty evacuation. Palestinians rush to the evacuated settlements to loot, destroy the greenhouses they were supposed to use to become economically self-sufficient, and burn synagogues.
- Hamas wins the Palestinian elections. Not exactly an endorsement of peace. Many critics of the disengagement point to the Hamas electoral victory as a sign that the Palestinians viewed the Israeli withdrawal as a military defeat at the hands of Hamas; hence their popular support. I'm skeptical; it seems more likely that Fatah can't get votes without party discipline or the personality cult surrounding Yasser Arafat.
- Qassam fire continues unabated, and actually increases significantly in range and accuracy (as well as numbers). Since disenagement, something like half a dozen Israelis have been killed by Qassams, and dozens more have been wounded. Economic and property damage (particularly to Sderot) is in the millions, not to mention psychological trauma from nearly daily mortar fire. Attempts to curb Qassam fire by half-hearted military tactics (mostly artillery hitting empty fields and airstrikes, with a handful of commando operations) have only limited success.
- Arms smuggling under the Egyptian border occurs at a breakneck pace; tons of weaponry, some of it advanced antitank missiles (which gave Israel so much trouble in Lebanon) and reportedly longer range rockets (though this may have been a boast by the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade). Egyptian authorities are reluctant to commit much force to ending smuggling, and world reaction to Israeli closures of the border makes that a politically unwise move for more than a week or two. Also, smuggling of funds by Hamas occurs openly through the EU-controlled Rafah crossing. Hamas begins training its forces in earnest for an all-out battle with Israel for control of the Gaza Strip, fortifying its positions and improving its weaponry and tactics.
- Hamas operatives attack Israel by tunneling under the Gaza border, kill a number of soldiers, and take Gilad Shalit hostage. This precipitates semi-serious Israeli ground action in Gaza, which is scaled down due to the Lebanon war, international pressure, and disagreements between the political and military echelons (Olmert and Peretz generally working on dead-end negotiations and urging 'calm' despite previous claims to the contrary, while IDF commanders urge an incursion in force to permanently hold positions being used for much of the rocket launching, with West Bank-style nightly arrest raids to make the Strip 'behave' in much the way that the West Bank does). Negotiations for Shalit's release, while rumored for months to be 'nearly complete', seem to drag on indefinitely. Indirect IDF action to curb Qassam fire (e.g. artillery) ends up accidentally killing a number of Palestinian civilians.
- Fatah-Hamas tensions, always a significant issue, come to a head. General disturbances break out in Gaza, resulting in a number of deaths and assassinations (including several children who are gunned down during an assassination attempt). Repeated 'truces' arbitrated between Abbas and Haniyeh fail to stop the fighting. As part of one of these truces, the PA pledges to stop rocket fire (supposedly deploying thousands of police to do so), yet the rockets continue to fall - today, hitting next to a nursery in Sderot, though fortunately not killing any children.
- Throughout it all, the Palestinian economy falls apart even more in the factional violence (particularly with the general Western embargo of aid to Hamas, given the organization's continued endorsement of terrorism).
So, where does this leave us? The Gaza Strip is a mess. And, to be honest, I don't have much patience for those who want me to feel sympathy. Israel left, in a difficult process, and this is what the Palestinians have made of their chance. The violence has only increased (despite the complete absence of Israeli troops and civilians for close to a year, and the relative absence of troops thereafter) and the Palestinians are doing a wonderful job of torpedoing any hope they may have had for a decent future.
It makes me furious. Do I still think Israel should have gone through the wrenching process of disengagement? Probably, if only to show that this is what happens. However, I see no reason to endorse any further Israeli withdrawals or concessions. No 'confidence building steps' to support Abbas - no $100 million in withheld taxes to shore up his party, no Fatah 'militant' (read: terrorists who we don't hate quite as much as Hamas) groups allowed in from Jordan, and certainly no release of prisoners just to show we're nice people. [Note: All three of these have been approved/will be soon by the Olmert government. Whiskey, Tango, Foxtrot...]
These sorts of things betray the thinking that was behind the disengagement - noble thoughts, but ones that have clearly been disproven by continued Palestinian intransigence and violence. Every Israeli concession has been treated as a sign that the Palestinian method of 'negotiation' (ie, shoot at people until they give up) works, and they only redouble their efforst at such forms of... ahem... diplomacy.
So, you ask, what is the solution? Obviously, Israel cannot let the situation in Sderot continue, nor can they allow Hamas to use Iranian funds and weapons to make the Gaza Strip a fortified terrorist state within 20 km of the Israeli heartland.
My proposed solution is not a 'solution' but a stalling tactic. I'd suggest that (probably after the fall of the Olmert government) the IDF be given a green light for a systematic military operation against terrorist activity in Gaza. This will involve the establishment of semi-permanent military positions on or near major Qassam launching areas (the withdrawal from which last year allowed terrorists to achieve much better range and accuracy in launching Qassams) and other strategic regions; a system of roadblocks and checkpoints to restrict the transport of weapons and terrorists; aggressive action along the Philadelphi corridor and in Rafah to close tunnels and stop smuggling; immediate targeting of all Hamas government leaders who are involved in the military wing of the organization; nightly arrest raids into Palestinian cities; destruction of arms caches, etc.
It would be bloody, in the beginning - probably worse than Defensive Shield. And the IDF would pick up casualties during the 'maintenance' phase, as well... but military casualties are better than Israeli civilian casualties (a minor detail that recent Israeli governments have sometimes had difficulty remembering). Palestinian civilian casualties would also occur, but probably not significantly worse than from the current Gaza infighting and indirect Israeli tactics (airstrikes/artillery/etc.). Most importantly, this operation would make the Gaza Strip 'behave' in a way that it hasn't for over a decade. The model was adopted for the West Bank because it was necessary given the lack of an effective border and the relatively increased movement between Palestinian and Israeli areas. It can be adapted for Gaza, and it can work to keep things on a 'low simmer' as they are in the West Bank.
A good solution? Hardly! The world would be pissed, but to be honest, they're going to be pissed anyways, so Israel might as well earn some security at the same time. It won't work forever, but it will buy Israel some peace for its citizens. Suicide bombings were stopped by the WB barrier and Defensive Shield; Qassams and Hamas rearmament can be stopped by similar tactics.
The only long term solution, though, is not one Israel can impose... or even one that can be negotiated with Western pressure. It will come someday through the Palestinian people themselves. They will look at their leaders and role models and realize that the Palestinian logic of 'resistance' and refusal to compromise - even in the face of serious chances (such as the disengagement, or the 2000 Camp David summit) - will always fail, as Israel isn't planning on marching into the sea anytime soon. They will rise up and install new leaders who will follow the example of Sadat and Hussein in working with the Israelis in a spirit of compromise - albeit a grudging one.
Until that day, though, the disengagement has taught me that Israel cannot afford any more 'confidence building measures' that expose its nurseries to shelling.
[Note: As of this morning, there have been fifty-six Qassams fired at Israel since the 'truce' began a few weeks ago. According to this article, only three months in the past year have had more Qassam attacks than this past month, during the supposed 'calm' from the 'truce'. I am less than impressed. So, Israel pulled its troops out of Gaza again to honor a 'truce' that in fact brings no peace. Hmm.]
6.12.06
Surrealist Threats 101
Israeli newspapers keep on reporting about how various Palestinian terror groups (Islamic Jihad, Hamas, AAMB, to name a few) have been making menacing statements along the lines of 'If Israel doesn't stop arrest raids in the West Bank, we'll stop the cease-fire in Gaza.'
Now, aside from the fact that the cease fire was clearly decided on merely for the Gaza Strip (making their suggestions kind of nuts), I'm rather amused that Israeli papers are making such a big deal about it. My reaction upon hearing these pronouncements was pretty simple:
WHAT cease fire?
You mean the one where Palestinian terrorists said they would stop attacks against Israel if Israel pulled out of Gaza? Well, guess what: since Israel pulled out 9 days ago, there have been eighteen rockets shot at Israeli territory. That's two a day.
Now, I don't know about you, but if the US was getting rockets shot at us by Mexico twice a day, I don't think we'd consider that a 'cease fire'. What are the terrorists going to do, shoot rockets at Israel? They already are.
Honestly, a threat needs more than the capability of carrying it out. To have any effectiveness, you are also required to not be carrying out said threat at the same time you're threatening it "or else".
Now, aside from the fact that the cease fire was clearly decided on merely for the Gaza Strip (making their suggestions kind of nuts), I'm rather amused that Israeli papers are making such a big deal about it. My reaction upon hearing these pronouncements was pretty simple:
WHAT cease fire?
You mean the one where Palestinian terrorists said they would stop attacks against Israel if Israel pulled out of Gaza? Well, guess what: since Israel pulled out 9 days ago, there have been eighteen rockets shot at Israeli territory. That's two a day.
Now, I don't know about you, but if the US was getting rockets shot at us by Mexico twice a day, I don't think we'd consider that a 'cease fire'. What are the terrorists going to do, shoot rockets at Israel? They already are.
Honestly, a threat needs more than the capability of carrying it out. To have any effectiveness, you are also required to not be carrying out said threat at the same time you're threatening it "or else".
Just call me a Russkie
I recently considered applying to a fellowship in graduate school that I received an email about. It's the Dolores Zohrab Liebmann Fund, that funds a number of graduate students (primarily in the sciences and engineering) at a moderate level for a few years.
What convinced me not to apply, though, was this stipulation in the eligibility rules:
Whew. What is this, the 1950s? We have to swear we're not Communists? Sounds like Senator McCarthy is chuckling from the grave.
Now, I'm not a communist, but neither am I a wholehearted supporter of unrestrained capitalism. My grandparents are proud Labor Zionists, and I have a lot of sympathy for pseudosocialist viewpoints (though I think they are often misapplied). Would that mean I 'support' some of the Communist doctrine? Probably Ms. Liebmann would think so.
Now, I understand this still exists today because it was in her will. But it just seems so... archaic. It makes me wonder what made Ms. Liebmann so opposed to Communism that this was her sole stipulation about the candidate's character or ideology.
Weird.
What convinced me not to apply, though, was this stipulation in the eligibility rules:
In her Will, Dolores Zohrab Liebmann stated that:
"It is my desire that no benefit from such Fellowships or scholarships be enjoyed by any person who, or institution which, supports, advocates or upholds the principles and doctrines of Communism."
Accordingly:
a) If the Candidate or the institution supports, advocates, or upholds the principles and doctrines of Communism, the Trustee reserves the right to reject the application.
b) The Trustee also reserves the right to require the Candidate to submit an affidavit, affirmed or sworn to before a Notary Public, confirming that he or she does not support, advocate, or uphold the doctrines of Communism.
Whew. What is this, the 1950s? We have to swear we're not Communists? Sounds like Senator McCarthy is chuckling from the grave.
Now, I'm not a communist, but neither am I a wholehearted supporter of unrestrained capitalism. My grandparents are proud Labor Zionists, and I have a lot of sympathy for pseudosocialist viewpoints (though I think they are often misapplied). Would that mean I 'support' some of the Communist doctrine? Probably Ms. Liebmann would think so.
Now, I understand this still exists today because it was in her will. But it just seems so... archaic. It makes me wonder what made Ms. Liebmann so opposed to Communism that this was her sole stipulation about the candidate's character or ideology.
Weird.
3.12.06
It's official
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